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NATO BEFORE AND AFTER THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS*
Leo J. Reddy**

There are few black and white issues in the field of foreign
relations. The problems that NATO faced and that our government
faced as a member of NATO in responding to the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia illustrate at least some of the complexities that
may not have been evident in the news reports.
For example, there is a widely held impression that NATO was
in a state of decline prior to August 20, 1968 when the Soviet
armies marched on Prague, and that this event snatched the organization from the jaws of historical oblivion. This statement
greatly oversimplifies the actual state of affairs. In order to
understand how NATO responded to the Czech invasion and what the
implications are of the United States in the longer term, it is
important to have a brief look at where NATO stood prior to the
events of last August.
NATO Before Czechoslovakia
In the months prior to the Czech invasion, NATO had been
concerned with three main items of business: first, to adapt
to French withdrawal from the military command structure; second,
to reevaluate the role of the organization at a time when improved
relations with Eastern Europe appeared increasingly possible; and
third, to continue developing a military strategy and force
posture that was politically and economically acceptable to all
the members. At this time, there was also to be overcome the
psychological obstacle of NATO's twentieth anniversary in 1969 -a date at which any member could give notice of withdrawal from
the Treaty.
Well before last summer, NATO had adjusted to the withdrawal
of French forces from the integrated command structure. In a
businesslike and professional manner, the French and the other
fourteen members worked out procedures which permitted France to
opt out of military affairs, but continue to participate in the
political business of the Alliance. Through quiet, patient
diplomacy this was accomplished without serious friction between
the Fourteen and France, or among the Fourteen. These procedures
have given the French a legitimate voice in the political business
of the Alliance but do not permit France to obstruct important
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business that the other Fourteen wish to conduct on defense
matters. At the same time, NATO and United States bases and
headquarters were removed from France and relocated to other
countries.
This was a substantial diplomatic feat. There was by no
means unanimity at the outset among the Allies as to how they
would handle French withdrawal. Some members wanted a punitive
policy; others wanted to accommodate to the French at virtually
any price.
NATO also confronted in 1967 the issues raised by a growing
desire to improve relations with Eastern Europe. For some years
it has been clear that the societies of Eastern Europe were, in
varying degrees, undergoing changes both internally and in their
relations with Moscow. This has been most evident in Romania
for several years and became dramatically evident in Czechoslovakia
over a year ago. One manifestation-of these changes was growing
cultural, economic and political contacts between Eastern and
Western Europe. Quite naturally there was strong sentiment in
all the NATO countries to expand these contacts, to break down
the barriers that had been erected during the cold war and to
create a new relationship with the East on which could be built
a stable and durable peace. These trends posed two major questions
for NATO. First, there were many, particularly the younger people
in Europe, who had no memories of the Cold War, who saw no need
for a military alliance in a period when relations appeared to be
warming between East and West. In fact, they saw NATO as a major
obstacle in the path of further progress toward relaxation of
tensions in Europe. Such a policy soon acquired the handy label
of "detente."
The second issue was whether NATO should have a
common policy toward the East, and if so, what specific steps
could be taken to give further impetus to detente.
In the fall of 1966 Pierre Harmel, the Belgian Foreign
Minister, began to urge his colleagues to address these issues.
The result was the so-called Harmel Study on the Future Tasks of
the Alliance. The Harmel report, which was completed in December
1967 and unanimously approved by all Fifteen members of NATO,
stated that NATO had two basic functions:
"Its first function is to maintain adequate military
strength and political solidarity to deter aggression
and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory
of member countries of aggression should occur. .... "
"In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second
function, to pursue the search for progress towards a
more stable relationship in which the underlying
political issues can be solved. Military security and
a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary."

These conclusions were not dramatic; they did not set NATO
off on-a major new course because no such course was needed.
The Harmel Report did not result in instant new understanding
of or enthusiasm for NATO. Such dramatic changes seldom occur
in politics. However, the Report did chart for NATO a sensible
course which avoided the extremes of clinging to a cold war
policy on the one hand or of weakening deterrence on the other.
Furthermore, it was a policy on which all Fifteen members of
the Alliance -- including France -- were able to agree.

Thus,

the unity on fundamental lines of policy -- so essential to the
continued vitality of NATO -- was maintained. This was not easy
as there were some members who wished to emphasize defense more
strongly; others who wished greater emphasis on detente. Yet
there remained a willingness to find common ground for the sake
of unity. This desire to achieve consensus demonstrated that
all of the members -- even before Czechoslovakia -- placed a

high value on the maintenance of the Alliance.
The third issue with which NATO was grappling prior to the
Czech affair has been a continuing one for the Alliance. This
is what strategy and what forces NATO should maintain. While
the issues are too complex to discuss in detail here, the point
should be made that the force plahning procedures of the Alliance
have not only continued to function, but have been improved in
the past several years. Furthermore, the members are able to
discuss frankly among themselves conflicting views on strategy;
particularly in the field of nuclear strategy, there has been
a much fuller exchange of views in the last several years than
there was in the past. The significance of force planning and
strategic discussions should not be exaggerated, but neither
should their importance be minimized. Ultimate decisions on
forces are always made by the individual countries as these
decisions involve financial determinations that only a national
government can make. However, each member's defense programs
are annually subjected to careful scrutiny and criticism by
his allies, and there is an opportunity to bring significant
international pressures to bear to improve forces and coordinate
strategy. This could not occur in the absence of an Alliance.
In sum, NATO was a functioning, far from moribund, organization prior to Czechoslovakia. It had sensed the changing
political environment, come to grips with it, and enunciated a
doctrine to deal with change. It had begun its planning for a
period of possible expanded detente. Yet it had also sounded
a warning against excessive optimism about the pace of detente
and continued its efforts to strengthen and modernize the
deterrent forces. There were many who thought this was too
timid a policy, still mired in the rhetoric and thinking of
the Cold War. However, the events of August 20 demonstrated

the essential wisdom of those who insisted that NATO was still
essential and that the Allies should not permit any degradation
of their deterrent capabilities.
NATO Since Czechoslovakia
There are two stories one sees frequently about NATO's
reaction to the Czech events. On the one hand, NATO has been
criticized for impotence because it could do nothing to forestall the Czech invasion or force the withdrawal of Soviet
troops once this occurred. On the other hand, NATO is accused
of over-reacting and of placing too much emphasis on military
rather than political responses. These accusations reflect the
complexities of a large alliance, but both criticisms, while
they have some seeds of truth, reflect a misunderstanding of
NATO's role and what NATO has done to carry out that role in
the light of the events in Eastern Europe.
First it is frequently reported that NATO was taken by
surprise by the Czech invasion. This is only partly true. It
was certainly no surprise that relations between the Czechs
and the Soviets had been deteriorating for some time; the
Soviets were clearly displeased with the Dubcek-Svoboda government and its reform programs. It was no surprise that Soviet
troops had been conducting maneuvers on the Czech border in a
menacing fashion for some weeks. What could not be predicted
was whether these troops would be used to invade Czechoslovakia
or to put pressure on the Czechs in more subtle ways, and if
they were used to invade the country, just exactly when this
would occur. Some observers in the West did engage in some
wishful thinking. Many Westerners simultaneously held two
contradictory views: that the Soviet Union would never use
force against Czechoslovakia and that the continuation of the
liberal trends in Eastern Europe would lead to the disintegration of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. Obviously the
Soviets could see this too, and they saw the threat to their
interests in Eastern Europe to be greater than the risk of
using force. NATO did recognize correctly that whatever threat
there was to Czechoslovakia did not constitute a direct military
threat to the countries of NATO, i.e., that the Soviets would
not move into the NATO treaty area.
In the days following August 20 there were two major concerns around the NATO Council table in Brussels. One was to
make sure that the military action in Eastern Europe did not
spill over into the West. The second was to avoid any acts
that would provide a pretext for further repression by the
Soviets in Eastern Europe or further justification for the
actions already taken. (Moscow had tried, rather lamely, to

sense of realism that pervaded that meeting. Gone was some of
the wishful thinking of earlier years. But neither was there
panic nor over-reaction. Several of the European members saw
more clearly than they had a few months earlier the need to
maintain strong NATO defenses. But they also perceived the
need to keep open the door for future contact with the East.
It was further recognized that change in Eastern Europe could
bring both new hope and new problems and that NATO was still
essential in a Europe that had still not solved postwar problems.
The Lesson of the Czech Affair
First, it appears clear, and certainly the United States
Government thinks it is clear, that NATO is still very much
needed. There is complete unanimity on this score among the
Fifteen members including the French. NATO is needed because
there is still a threat -to Western Europe from the East. This
threat takes a somewhat different form today than it did twenty
years ago when NATO was founded. Then there was a very real
possibility of a military attack against Western Europe by
Soviet armies that were-far superior in strength to those of
the NATO countries. Today that threat is judged by most people
to be far more remote. But it is remote precisely because NATO
has created the military strength and the unity of purpose
which makes it perfectly clear to the Soviet Union that an
attack on Western Europe would not serve Soviet interests. The
deterrent depends heavily, but by no means solely, on United
States nuclear forces. It also requires sizable and modern
non-nuclear forces and a unity of purpose among the states of
the North Atlantic area.
Today the threat to Western interests stem much more from
the rapid change which is occurring in Eastern Europe, the
Soviet willingness to use force to resist change when it
threatens their interests, and the risk that the use of force
by the Soviets could spill over into the West. The principal
danger spot in Europe remains Berlin, where the United States,
Great Britain and France have a firm commitment to maintain
the freedom of that city. But there are also potential risks
in the so-called "grey areas", where the use of force by the
Soviets would certainly create serious tensions in Europe.
Second, while the prospects for improved relations between
Eastern and Western Europe have received a temporary setback,
there is no question that in the years ahead efforts will be
renewed to improve relations between East and West. While NATO
is primarily a defensive alliance, it is also in the business
of seeking a peaceful resolution to the problems which divide
Europe. NATO must adapt to the changing environment in Europe.
It can serve as a useful clearing house to assure that the

claim that Western interference in Czechoslovakia had prompted
their intervention.) Thus, the initial NATO response was
cautious:
strong disapproval of the invasion both by actions
and words and a clear indication that NATO would not stand by
if the Soviets extended their aggression to other countries.
At the same time, it was agreed to avoid military actions of
any sort that could give the Soviets any sort of excuse for
further military action themselves or for repressive political
acts against the Czechs. Thus, if the initial reactions by
NATO appeared modest, they were intended to be so, but the
political representation by all of the Western powers made
perfectly clear their disapproval and served strong warning
to the Soviets against taking any actions against Western
interests.
The second phase of NATO's response was a careful joint
appraisal of the events in Czechoslovakia, how they affected
the interests of the NATO members and what actions needed to
be taken to serve NATO's objectives, particularly the maintenance
of an effective defense posture. This took some time as the
assessment was complex and it was important to arrive at a
consensus as to the appropriate response. The assessment was
complex because the new threat posed to the Alliance was not
solely or even primarily military. True there were now more
Warsaw Pact divisions close to the borders of NATO countries.
But more important was the greater uncertainty as to future
Soviet actions. This was hardly clarified by an article which
appeared in Pravda proclaiming what appeared to be a new
Soviet doctrine of "Socialist Commonwealth" and proporting to
justify military intervention in any Socialist state. Perhaps
most difficult was the need to readjust the hopes that many
had harbored that we had already entered a new era of peaceful
relations in Europe.
The NATO assessment was not too dissimilar from that
reached in the Harmel Study a year before. While hopes for
early progress toward improved relations with the East had
received a sharp setback, there was no disposition to return
to the sharp confrontation of the earlier years of the cold
war. There was now a greater willingness to undertake some
of the measures for the common defense that had long been
needed - particularly measures to improve the capability for
rapid mobilization of forces. The invasion of Czechoslovakia
had dramatized the need for a more rapid mobilization capability and qualitative improvements in the armed forces in
the West.
When the Ministers met in November they agreed to take
a series of steps, undramatic but militarily important, to
improve the defense capabilities of NATO. These steps, while
in themselves important, were not as significant as the new

various members in their relationships with Eastern Europe are
not operating at cross purposes. It can also do some useful
prepaiatory work as part of the efforts to reduce tensions.
For example, the Alliance is continuing its study of mutual
force reductions in Central Europe. If such reductions can
ever be negotiated with the East, this will concern NATO as
a defense alliance for it will bear on the relative military
capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If at some future
date force reductions can be negotiated, these reductions
could contribute to stability rather than instability in
Central Europe.
Finally, we face a period of great change in Europe on
both sides of what used to be called the Iron Curtain. In
the West there is a strong desire to be rid of the tension of
the Cold War and to form a new relationship with Eastern
Europe. At the same time, far-sighted statesmen in the West
continue to search for new ways to bring greater unity to
Western Europe. To some extent these two desires conflict,
and ways will have to be found to accommodate both desires.
In Eastern Europe the process of change poses both problems and opportunities for the members of the Atlantic
Alliance. Certainly we favor the process of liberalization
that has occurred in Eastern Europe over the last several years.
In the long run, a secure peace in Europe can be achieved only
by a simultaneous process of self-determination in the East
and accommodation between the East and West. But as the recent
events in Czechoslovakia have shown, the process of change is
likely to be punctuated by periods of tension since liberalization in Eastern Europe is a clear threat to the leaders of
the Kremlin. They have shown that they recognize this threat
and that they are prepared to use force to shape change to their
design of the future. Thus, there seems to be many more uneasy
years ahead. The goal of the United States, however, is clear -a secure and lasting peace not only in Europe but in the other
throubled spots of the world. Securing peace is a tedious
business, occasionally fraught with great dangers, but it is
a task worthy of the nation. It is the only course that it
can follow for there are no acceptable alternatives that would
assure its survival as a free society.

